Herman Bavinck’s “Praedestinatie” Speech: Election is the Crown!

Introduction

On Wednesday, February 20, 1918, Herman Bavinck—by this time 63 years old—delivered a speech on the doctrine of predestination. It is unknown exactly where Bavinck delivered the speech. It was common for Bavinck to give addresses during this time to the NCSV (the Nederlandsche Christen Studenten Vereeniging or Dutch Christian Students Association), the Anti-Revolutionary Party, or various ecclesial audiences.^[1] Nonetheless the broader context provides some background to the speech.

On that day in history, a single headline appeared on nearly every newspaper in the Netherlands: “de oorlog” (“the war”). The First World War, which had begun in 1914 and would not end until November of 1918, preoccupied the Dutch nation. The optimism of the previous century had come to a halt, and questions around the origin of evil became highly pertinent. The origin of evil takes a more prominent stage in Bavinck’s address, whereas in his Reformed Dogmatics it is only peripheral (2004, 241–245). Four years earlier, in a speech at the outset of the war years, Bavinck admitted, “We are in a great quandary with this war, and do not know how to place it in our rational, moral, Christian worldview” (1914, 7).^[2] Reflecting on war, evil, and suffering in this address, Bavinck attempted to attend to this “great quandary.”

The speech has five sections: (1) The problem of unity and diversity, (2) the problem of evil, (3) the hope of immortality, (4) correcting caricatures of predestination, and (5) the doctrine as a source of certainty and comfort (Bavinck 1918, 1–12).

Bavinck begins his lecture by noting one of the most significant problems facing mankind at the turn of the twentieth century: the issue of unity and diversity, an issue that could also be presented as the universal and the particular or the one and the many. He perceives this question as being wrapped up with fundamental questions of spirit and matter, being and becoming, the nature of philosophy as a science (globus intellectualis) and the struggle between mechanical and organic worldviews. These problems of course each signal Bavinck’s participation in the modern—nineteenth-century and twentieth-century—philosophical discourse.

With respect to the idea of unity, Bavinck surveys several philosophers.^[3] In the wake of Kant, Bavinck perceives the emergence of another group of philosophers whose work proceeded not from unity, but from the idea of diversity. For these philosophers he explains, reality is composed of “independent beings absolutely distinct from each other” (Bavinck 1918, 4). Everything is mechanical, aggregate, separated, undepicted diversity. In other words, not the single organic substance of Baruch Spinoza, but the monism of Gottfried W. Leibniz.

Bavinck perceives that proceeding from absolute unity or superlative diversity ultimately does not resolve the problem of the one and the many. The aggregate diversity lacks unity; the faux unity is in truth an imposed uniformity. The solution he presents is the unity-in-diversity of the divine idea, executed by the divine will. As Bavinck puts it, “Christianity provides the solution in the wisdom and will of God: unity and diversity are in its thought, its system; if the world is presently a system of thought, its unity, diversity are given in her; called into being through Gods will, his holy, moral will” (1918, 4). Bavinck perceives this true unity-in-diversity as only being present in Christianity, in the wisdom and will of God. Therefore, just as the divine thought is unity-in-diversity, the reality of the world is too. This is a classic Bavinckian move: unity-in-diversity ad intra leads to unity-in-diversity ad extra (Eglinton 2012, 68, 81). It is also notable that this move is how Bavinck permits himself the leverage to appropriate philosophy.

In the second section Bavinck turns to the origin of evil. By the end of the nineteenth century, confidence in the doctrine of divine providence was waning. Discussions of providence “tended to stress our lack of knowledge” and appealed instead to a future hope. The traumas of the First World War destroyed the remaining confidence (Fergusson 2018, 208–210). If the world is called into existence through God’s will according to God’s thought, what does one do with the problem of evil? One may see the effect of this trauma in Bavinck’s more direct approach to the origin of evil in relation to God’s providence in this speech. His approach to the question of predestination thus becomes distinctly ethical. Surveying the various philosophies and their solutions to the issue of evil, he discerns them as all proposing an ethical distinction in the “act of the will” (Bavinck 1918, 6). This he perceives as nothing other than a return to the age-old discussion of Augustine and Pelagius. Bavinck’s concern was that should humans be viewed as disparate individuals à la Pelagianism, we will fail to explain the pervasiveness of sin, leading in turn to a split between the ethical and the psychological. Moreover, he claims that Pelagianism is contrary not just to every “pious confession,” but to all human experience.

Christianity here gives reconciliation and resolution, in the wisdom of God’s counsel. Such a terrible phenomenon such as sin, which enters into all things, etc., cannot be extracted from God’s counsel. Then the world would be beyond his control. Then randomness, chance everywhere, the end and purpose of the world uncertain. All people would be independent, autonomous, acting as they please. Atomism, pluralism, anarchy. (1918, 6)

Taking the side of Augustine, he judged mankind to be a cohesive whole. In his view, then, Christianity ultimately provides the greatest harmony to the world. Therefore, we find Bavinck conceiving the world as a unity-in-diversity, which reflects the unity-in-diversity of the Trinity. This unity-in-diversity is rooted in the counsel of God (see also Parker 2024, 54–55). This complements Eglinton’s reading by suggesting that Bavinck’s organic motif is rooted not only in the triune life, but also in the plenitude of the divine essence itself.

In the third section of the speech, Bavinck’s argument progresses one step further: there is not only unity-in-diversity in this life, but also in the afterlife. Thus Bavinck pulls the thread of unity-in-diversity through to the last things: just as the divine life is unity-in-diversity, and this life is revealed in the unities-in-diversity of creation, so too in the afterlife there is unity-in-diversity. He writes, “We must accept that there will be in the life hereafter a difference in lot, in much greater diversity than the terms heaven and hell indicate, because there are endless degrees in heaven and hell, in reward and punishment. Diversity remains” (1918, 7).

In addition, Bavinck perceives the idea of immortality as a witness to its reality in the afterlife. He observes, “Immortality stands fixed, it is an element of natural religion; humanity is destined for eternity” (1918, 7). This view, Bavinck thought, was universally accepted in practice, not in theory. This is true also for the distinction between good and evil. The longing for immortality and the witness of unity-in-diversity beckon the human race toward its destiny. The various experiences of our life and the disparity of the future life have the counsel of God as their foundation—not just for man, but for the entire world. All of life and the life to come is rooted in the divine counsel. Bavinck discusses the divine counsel in a manner that reflects his participation in modern philosophical discourse. This idea will be resumed in the later section on development.

In the fourth section, Bavinck aims to communicate a vision of the doctrine of election that alleviates tensions with the freedom of man. He first combats the charge of arbitrariness and expresses that all things are systematically arranged in the divine idea. This divine idea is then executed by the divine will. At this point Bavinck necessarily re-engages the problem of evil and sin which was only partially answered above. He identifies all things with the counsel and will of God while maintaining that God is not the author of evil. In this respect Bavinck can be associated with the classical Augustinian tradition.

He also resumes the discussion of the freedom of man against this backdrop. In his notes, Bavinck cites Scottish theologian William Hastie (1842–1903), drawing on Hastie’s view that the liberty of indifference is rejected by all Reformed theologians. The Reformed, he thought, understood the liberty of the will as the ability “to act in accordance with its own determinations and independently of external compulsion or co-action; and their view has been corroborated by the whole tendency of modern science.” This view, Hastie also posited, was “consistent with divine foreordination” (Hastie 1904, 256–57). Thus, following Hastie and the Reformers, Bavinck takes a positive conception of freedom—one that roots the evil of sin with man.

In the final section of the speech, Bavinck’s notes take on an outline form with six points (1918, 11–12). These are each intimately connected to faith and may be summarized as dealing with the certainty and comfort of faith. The certainty of faith, according to Bavinck, is that prior to all thinking, willing, and doing, we possess certainty of ourselves, the world, and God in our self-consciousness.^[4] On account of the certainty of faith we trust God even in turbulent times. Through faith, rooted in election, we attempt to align all our thinking, feeling, willing, and doing in accordance with the will of God. The certainty of faith introduces a harmony into the Christian’s world-and-life view. Christ’s victory over sin and death provides the greatest certainty of the harmony of the world. This faith, however, is not bare. It is an open hand that receives and in turn acts. It finds its eternal security in the action of God and drives forward in new life toward God and neighbor (see also Bavinck 2017, 67–84).

Through the person and work of Christ believers may partake in “the settlement of God’s kingdom” over Satan and the world and participate in his will such that all thinking and doing is in line with God’s governance of the world. Bavinck writes, “through knowing this doctrine, we shall do bold deeds. The confession of predestination fosters a moral, active life” (1918, 12). This active life is expanded in Bavinck’s doctrine of sanctification, in the imitation of Christ, and the indwelling of the Spirit. Importantly, Bavinck envisions that knowledge results in action.

Finally, election also provides comfort in times of uncertainty. Here, Bavinck returns to the Heidelberg Catechism, Question 1: “What is your only comfort in life and death?” There is a conscious dependence, then, on the providence of God. For all the activities of the world are, as Bavinck writes, the “ongoing, unfolding, developing of God’s glory in his creatures, from lower to higher, through nature, ethos, and grace. Election is the crown!” The end to which the predestined are being drawn is the crown of election. The elect participate as free active ethical agents—not as agents earning their salvation, but as children doing the will of their Father. The final line of the speech is: “From, through, and to God are all things. God is all in all” (1918, 11–12) This is a clear allusion to Romans 11:36. This motif summarizes Bavinck’s theological program and indeed can be pictured across this speech: all things are from (predestination), through (providence), and to (election).

It is noticeable, for a speech likely given to young adults, that Bavinck intersperses throughout his Dutch lecture technical Latin theological terms and phrases (providentia; Quod ultimum est in executione, primum est is intentione, etc.). This ought to signal at least one thing for those who receive his words today. That is, it reflects the tradition of Reformed scholastic theology, where Latin served as the lingua franca of dogmatic precision. Bavinck also deploys Latin loanwords such as praedestinatie [praedestinatio], and electie [electio]. To this end, it displays Bavinck’s continued efforts to be a theologian in the tradition of Reformed orthodoxy. As a lecture or public speech, we ought to imagine the rhetorical effect of this. This precision would have been important to Bavinck given that his speech is bringing election into conversation with modern philosophy, but also the more formal, technical theological terms therefore display their enduring usefulness. Only once does Bavinck use the more common Dutch term for election, verkiezing. The technical grammar of theology is not to be squashed by modern philosophy, even when Bavinck critically appropriates philosophy. Instead, the climactic moment of the speech exhibits its enduring importance. Thus, the speech concludes by drawing the hearer definitively toward the sovereignty of God and the pre-eminence of election in relation to ethics, precisely in the more technical Latinate of Dutch Reformed orthodoxy.

Considering that Bavinck gave this speech toward the end of his life, the question arises: What is new about its handling of election? First, in this speech, Bavinck brings the divine counsel into direct conversation with modern philosophy—an innovative development in his approach to election. He writes, “Reason - Will are the foundation and roots of all things (Hegel and Schopenhauer) combined. And then as a counsel: idea and will of a wise, holy, and righteous God, who will justify himself, on whom we can rely” (Bavinck 1918, 8). Bavinck perceived G. W. Hegel (1770–1831) and Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) as philosophically useful to his articulation.^[5] He does not appropriate their two distinct systems but rather sees them both as gesturing toward a divine counsel, which is ultimately perfected in the theology of Christianity. Hegel largely shaped the philosophical discourse at the beginning of the twentieth century, and Schopenhauer the end of the nineteenth. According to Frederick Beiser, “In Germany in the late 19th century, it was more than a mood. Pessimism had now become a philosophy, a whole worldview” (2016, 4). Beiser pins the prevalence of this worldview primarily on one individual, Arthur Schopenhauer, who he suggests “was the most famous and influential philosopher in Germany from 1860 until the First World War” ((2016, 13).

In his Lectures on the Philosophy of the World, Hegel posits that the fundamental argument of his philosophy is that reason governs the world (1955, 28; 1981, 27; see also Beiser 2005, 68–69). It is through the world that Hegel’s Absolute realizes itself. According to Bavinck, Hegel’s reason is an estranged version of the theological concept of providence (1918, 8). Indeed, Hegel sees reason as governing the world according to the divine plan (1955, 77, 67; 1981, 67; see Beiser 2005, 270–271). His historicism requires a teleological explanation of all things. Thus, history becomes the execution of the divine plan. And it is this aspect of Hegel’s historicism that Bavinck co-opted—although Bavinck’s own conception of the reason that governs the world was vastly different. For example, in his understanding of Hegel’s articulation God becomes the world (Bavinck 2018, 11, esp. 11n25). For Bavinck, the execution of the divine counsel does not end in the world, but in the world to come. Bavinck’s God is personal and independent of the world. His God is being not becoming (see also Eglinton 2011, 105–125). Earlier in the speech Bavinck references Hegel’s reason, writing that “Reason is nothing, becoming all things” (1918, 3). According to Bavinck, Hegel’s God is realized in the world. This is not so for Bavinck, for whom the divine idea of God (rather than God himself) is realized in the world (2003, 244–45). He borrows Hegel’s divine reason only so far as this reason steers all of reality toward the ends which God has determined.

In Über den Willen in der Natur, Schopenhauer, according to Beiser, argues that “the will is the ultimate cause of all organic phenomena in nature” (2014, 80). For Schopenhauer this will is not transcendent, but immanent: there is one monadic will within all things. However, in Beiser’s view Schopenhauer rejected both God and teleology, such that there was nothing divine behind the world and our existence (Beiser 2016, 17). While Schopenhauer denied the reality of the supernatural in Christian doctrine, he wholeheartedly affirmed the reality of evil and suffering (Beiser 2016, 7). This presented Schopenhauer with a problem: why continue to exist in a world abounding in suffering, but without prospect of divine redemption? Schopenhauer’s pessimism argued that suffering was the result of an unquenchable and relentless cosmic will. In Schopenhauer’s concept of the cosmic will, Bavinck discerns a counterpart version of Reformed conceptions of the divine will. According to Bavinck, Hegel’s reason and Schopenhauer’s cosmic will gesture toward a fully orbed conception of the divine counsel within philosophy. This is not to say, of course, that Bavinck was a Hegelian or a student of Schopenhauer. In his use of Hegel and Schopenhauer, rather, Bavinck pointed to two of the most significant philosophers of the previous century as gesturing toward the divine counsel and decree, which he saw as redemptively reclaimed in Reformed theology (1918, 8). It is in a nutshell a picture of Bavinck’s orthodox yet modern methodology.

The second portion of the speech that may be considered “new” is Bavinck’s approach to predestination through ethics. In the wake of the terrors of the First World War that shaped the second decade of the twentieth century, reflections on providence, election, and predestination required a shift from the more familiar methodological approach found in the Reformed Dogmatics. In this speech, Bavinck broaches the question through ethics. This ethical approach attempts to alleviate concerns of the problem of evil while seeking to retain both the freedom of man and the providence of God. For Bavinck, election is decidedly about God’s action, predestined in eternity and realized in time. This dogmatic locus draws our attention unreservedly toward God as the agent in salvation and toward an understanding of God as the primary agent in the ordering of history. God then elects to redeem and redemption affects a change. God’s election does not render the human a completely passive subject, but rather election fashions the human to be an active agent. This connection is facilitated by faith and the operation of the Spirit. Accordingly, in election God’s glory is unfurled in the creature as they participate in the unfolding development of God’s divine idea through God’s will, his holy and moral will.

One final thing must be attended to, and that is the importance of this speech in adding to the collective proof for envisioning a singular Bavinck. Now receding into the background of Bavinck studies is the pesky two-Bavincks narrative that dominated American Bavinck studies for a season (see Eglinton 2012; 2021; Bolt 2003, 264–265). This caused portions of Bavinck’s work to be wrongly considered “orthodox” and other portions “modern.” The narrative of an intellectually bi-polar Bavinck has been put to rest and for some it never existed. Indeed, more recently, Henk van den Belt argued that the indigenous Dutch reception of Bavinck never maintained a two-Bavincks reading, and that the hypothesis is an over-simplification of previous Bavinck scholarship (Van den Belt 2021). Similarly, Nelson Kloosterman contended it was a “misreading” and suggested the best path forward to be one of identifying “tensions.” Globally then, the field has returned to a more human view of Bavinck: that he was an individual whose thought could develop alongside his growth as a scholar. Tensions exist in his thinking, but these are not distressing; rather they reflect the development of a scholar. Alongside this “modern” development was the suggestion via Valentijn Hepp that Bavinck abandoned Reformed theology. The presence of this speech so late in Bavinck’s life in concurrence with Eglinton’s biography detailing the final chapter of Bavinck’s life demonstrates this claim to be inattentive or unaware of Bavinck’s activity in his final decade (Eglinton 2021, 261–265; Hepp 1921, 317–318).

Dutch Outline of the Speech

[1]^[6] Praedestinatie 20 Febr. 1918

I. Een v. de gewichtigste problemen:
eenheid, veelheid, geest, stof, zijn, worden, substanties, feit en actualiteit, ik, niet- ik.
eenheid: ik, zelfbew., pers. synthet. functie
veelheid, niet ik, worden, veranden, in onser geest, lichaam, wereld, streven naar eenhied in veelheid systeem, organisme, in gedachte, globus intellectualis

Pogingen tot vervoering, op organ., op mechan.
Lichaam of tempel
Brahm. Vedarel. Buddhism, maja, karma, Elea. Xen. Parm. Zeno, Spinoza, substantie
Heraclitus actualiteit, worden Fichte Hegel Nietzsche.
Pluralisme: atom. dynam. monadologie,
energieën, electronen
Theisme: a) derde boven de 2, syntheze
b) ik pers. eenheid, denken

[2] II. Eenheid en veelheid in de phys. wereld: hemel en aard, boven, beneden, oost & west, manl. & vrouwelijk, recht, links, licht-duister, dag-nacht overne tegenstellingens.
psych: onderscheid in gaven vermogens brachten. Leven- levenloos. Dan: onbewust – bewust, Dan zelfbewust, bewust. Slapende droomende, wakende monad.
ethisch: goed- kwaad. Ποθεν το κακον Unde malum. Verbijsterend probleem.
Buddh: karma. Pyth. Plato: praeexistente
val. Origens id. Kant. Jul. Müller. Theosophie, karma. Pelag.
Maar: a) menscheid zoo atoms, aggregaat.
b) onbegrijpelijk, dat ieder viel
c) overerving, erfzonde, samenhang der geslachten.
Theisme: a) zonde kan niet buiten Gods raad zijn
b) God staat er boven, kan zonde gebruiken.

[3] III. Dit alles nog niet zoo erg, maar werkt hiernamaals door. Niet waar, la farce est jouée. Onsterfelijkheid is art. mixtus, eisch na de zedel. wereldorde; van zin, doel der wereld, van Gods rijk dat wordt.
a) Niemand durft zeggen: 't is onverschillig wat en hoe gij leeft; wat ge zijt
b) ernst van 't geweten, van kateg. imperatief Kant rigorisme. Ethos hoog boven physis
c) loon en straf. Alles berecht — onverschillig.
Dat leven niet onverschillig voor 't hierna. Theosophie. Reincarnatie. Karma.

Dus lot verschil: object van praed. Niet buiten Gods bestuur. Quod ultimum est in executione, primum est is intentione.

Praedest. niet los van bestuur Gods over alles providentia.
In praed. ligt alles net zoo, als is de werkelijkheid, anneengeschakeld
Gods wijze raad, idee en actie, komt in wereld tot openbaring; alles loopt op Gods glorie uit.

[4] IV. Praedest daarom ook niet in strijd met zeden bewustzijn, factoren, want
a. Praed. niet besluit vooraf alleen, maar ook werkende, leidende idee en kracht. Euwigheid boven, ook in der tijd. Immanent.
b. Uit Gods raad komt alles in die orde, verband voort, als in werkel. Dus ook zonde, zed. bew. berouw wroeging verharding, lastering
c. In zonde ook een wet: de begeerlijkheid ontvangen hebbende. Sheol der zonde. Dat is vloek der booze daad
V. Bron van zekerheid, troost
a. Zekerheid in ons z., maar niet rustend op ons zelf, maar op waarheid
b. stemmend daarop dus onze wil ligt in het verlegde v. Gods wil, ligt van het Al
c. Histor bewijs: persoon en werk van X. dood en opstanding. Stirb und werde^[7]
d. troost: 't wordt eens alles goed
e. moed, heroism
f. aan den eindpaal van de tijden

Dutch Text of the Speech

Praedestinatie 20 Febr. 18

[1] I. Eenheid foundat. Begrip (Eisler) ontspringend uit de zelfbew. over het ik, dat zelf één is, alles tot eenheid verbindt,(eenheids functief, naar eenheid streeft); bron van alle eenheids begrijpen is. Het Ik is zelf eenheid, identiteits in verleden en hede en toekomst. Niet – ik.

Subj. eenheid dus; maar den ook obj. Eenheid, eenheid van een ding (Scholastiek omne quod est ideo est quia unum est), en dan weer unitas puncti, corporis, homogenii, principiorum, substantie, componentium, intelligibilium; of unitas numeralis en transcendens, of metaph. eenheid. En zoo tenslotte zijn leven, bewustzijn: slapend droomende wakende monad eenheid der wereld. Waar ligt die in? In God (Theisme, deisme, panth. Atheisme).

Volgens Kant is 't ik ook schepper, bron van de obj. eenheid in de wereld, door zijn synthetisch functie; de eenheid van 't zelfbew. is bron van alle eenheid in de kennis; brengt samenhang in de kernelementen.

[2] Eenheid sluit verscheidenheid, veelheid niet uit. Veelheid (Eisler) is een aantal van eenheden (monaden, individua, atoma); en we nemen die veelheid om op grond, ervaring. Hoe beide eenheid, veelheid (verscheidenheid, ongelijkheid) te verenigen. Vele pogingen. Vanwaar de ongelijkheid, veelheid. Organ en mechan. beschouwing tegenover elkaar; beeld van groei en van bouw, van lichaam en tempel (Paulus)

(Monisme)

Van de eenheid gaan uit de Veda philosophie, volgens welke alles een is en de veelheid schijn, maja. Het Brahmanism dat 2 ontwikkelde op grondslag was 4 Veda (=wetenschap) boeken, vooral de Rig-veda. 'T Brahm is een panth. stelsel: wereld ontvouwen van Brahm 't eene wezen grondslag v. alles; maar de werelds zoo apart bestaande is een kwaad, waarvan verlossing door ascese; wereld, ziel moet: 'T Een terugkeeren. 'T Berust dus op eeuwigen kringloop der dingen, des wereld, sluit en oneindige opvolging van geboorte en wedergeboorte, lijden en verlossing, dood en leven, terugkeer tot 't abs. wezen, onderdakeling van 't indiv. bestaan; scheiding der ziel van de materie oorzaak van 't indiv. bestaan is in 't Buddh. het

[3] karma, de zedel acts (maar bestond die voor de schepselen? (Silbernagl, Der Buddh. 31),^[8] die nu lot voortdurend bepaalt, totdat men wil om te leven doodt.

Zoo Eleat. School: 't zijnde is één, veelheid beweging is schijn. Heel de ziellijke waarneembare wereld is phaenomenaal. 't Al is in zijn natuur onveranderlijk, louter zijn, zonder worden. Xenophanes Parmenides, Zeno. Worden hier 't probleem. En zoo in alle panthe. stelsels; overgang van zijn tot worden, eenheid tot veelheid, God tot wereld is niet te vinden. 't Panth maaken zich van of door beelden: velaar en golven, zon en stralen. En dan af emanatie is God overvloeiend^[9] zijn, of evolution (Hegel): Vernunft is niet wordt alles.

Aan tegengestelde zijde gaat men uit van veelheid, [van voortdurende verandering, wisseling]^[10] worden. Heraclitues laste alle zijn op in een eeuwig worden, zoowel natuur en geschiedenis. Niet substantialiteit maar actualiteit, en zoo J. G. Fichte, Hegel, Wundt, Nietzsche. Het zijnde is dus eeuwige werkzaamheid, scheppend doen, eeuwig produceren, kracht, wil (Schopenh.), drang, drift.

[4] Pluralisme gaat van de veelheid uit. Werkelijkheid is veelheid van individua, atoma, zelfst. wezens van elkaar abs. gescheiden. Die wezens kunnen nu weer matter of spirit. opgevat. Dan krigt men 't atomisme (mater) in de oudheid v. Democritus. Atomen in ledig ruimte, gescheiden, gelijk in qualiteit, alleen onderscheiden in vorm, [ἀπαθης] niet kunnende lijden, eeuwig in beweging. Dingen zijn verbindingen v. atomen, mechanisch, aggregaat. Toeval^[11] (gelijk bij panth: noodlot εἱμαρμένη).^[12]

Geestelijk eenheden, henaden, monaden, monadologie, moniden meer psychisch, eerstelijk gedacht bij Leibniz. Niet ééne substantie (Spinoza) maar vele; niet mater, on-deelbare (atomisme), maar onlich.^[13] onuitgebeurd punctueel, eenvoudig psychisch, onvernietigbaar in zz. metaphpunten, points de substance, onverandelijk, zonder venster, innerlijk & ontwikkelend tot bewustzijn, met soort bew. en wil. En zoo in nieuweren tijd bij Lotze, I. H. Fichte, Ulrici, Busse, enz. En dan na mater, opgevat als wils acties (Wund), energieen (Ostwald), dynamiden (Hartmann), uitgangspunten v. beweging en doel, kracht centre (Liebmann), cf. electronen, ionen (H. de Vries).

Niet twee, maar drie: Derde hoogere syntheze, leven bevestigd. Christ. Christ. geeft oplossing in wijsheid en wil Gods: eenheid en veelheid in 't denken gegeven, systeem; als wereld nu systeem v. gedachten is, is eenheid, veelheid gegeven in haar; in 't aan zijn geroepen door Gods wil, zedelijke wil, heilig.

[5] wijl geen van beide beredigt, bemiddeling gezocht tusschen zijn en worden, eenheid, veelheid. Zoo 't Buddhisme met het karma. Pythagoras Plato met veelheid v. ideen, gecentraliseerd in de idee van 't goede, en met praeexistenten, gelijke zielen, wegens val in den kerker van 't lichaam geplaatst.

II. Maar eenheid en veelheid in phys. wereld al groot, schokt ons niet. In psych. wereld reeds meer: was onderscheids in gaven en krachten, verstand, gemoed, hart wils kracht. Nog meer schokkend in relig-eth. wereld: goed en kwaad, rechts en onrecht boozen & goeden enz. Van maar deze veelheid in de eenheid van 't menschelijk geslacht. Unde malum. Ποθεν το κακον? Antwoord gezocht door 't Buddh in het karma (zie boven). Door Pythagoras - Plato in veelheid v. ideeen gecentralizeerd in idee van 't goede en veelheid van gelijke zielen praeexistent, die vielen en toe straf geplaatst werden in lichaam al naar gelang van haar boosheid (steeds door, na den dood: reincarnatie). Door Plotinus, Gnostics in de verbinding des zielen, lichte elementen, met de mater die oorzaak v. onderscheid is. Door Origenes met praexistente zielenleer. Door Kant met intelligible vrijheid daad. Door Julius Müller etc.

Alleen hebben dit gemeen, dat zij 't ethisch onderscheid

[6] willen afleiden uit ethische daad uit wils daad. Cf. het Pelag., dat zonde niet afleidt uit voorwereldlijk daad, maar uit val v. iedere mensch apart, elk mensch ethisch tot een Adam maakt. Maar a) 't menschel. geslacht wordt zoo opgelost in individuen, aggregaat, b) 't eth. gebied wordt totaal gescheiden van 't physische en psychische.Totaal geisoleerd, c) onbegrijplijk, dat dan ieder gevallen is zonder uitzondering, d) blind voor 't feit van der eth. samenhang des menschen, voor de erfelijkheid ook van psych. en eth. eigenschappen, e) is in strijd met alles vroomen belijdenis : wij allen hebben gezondigd, zijn gelijk de anderen, en bevens met die van de genade, door elk vroomen erbeid in 't gebed. Niet de Farizeer, maar de Tollenaar.

'T Christ geeft hier verzoening en oplossing, in de wijsheid v. Gods raad. Zulk een ontzettend verschijnsel als de zonde, die in alles inrit enz, kan niet aan Gods raad, voor ontrekken zijn. Dan ware de wereld buiten zijn voors. Dan willekeur, toeval alom; einde en doel des wereld onzeker. Alle menschen zelfstandig, autonoom, handeled naar willekeur. Atomisme, pluralisme, anarchie.

[7] III. Nu ware dit alles nog zoo erg niet, als òf met des dood alles uit is, òf allen na den dood zalig werden. Doch dat is niet zoo. La farce est jouée is onwaar. Niemand is daar gerust op. Onsterfeilijkheid staat vast, is element van nat. religie; de mensch is voor de eeuwigheid bestemd. En was 't tweede aangaat: men durft nog wel zeggen: 't doel er niet toe, wat ge gelooft, maar niemand: 't doel er niet toe, hoe gij leeft, wie en wat ge zijt! Dat kan niemand zeggen, die eerst maakt met zijn geweten, met de zedewet met den kateg. imperatief, met 't recht der zedewet, met het wezenlijk onderscheid v. goed & kwaad, met de ervaring dat er goeden en boozen, rechts en onrechts zijn. Ook door Kant, en door modernen op vergad van mod. Theologen is dit erkend. We moeten 't aanvaarden, dat er hiernamaals verschil v. lotsbedeling bestaat, in veel grooter verscheidenheid dan de termen hemel en hel aanduiden, want graden zijn er eindeloos in hemel en hel, in loon en straf. Verscheidenheid blijft.

Welnu, dit zoo zijnde, moet er een praedestinatie zijn, een raad Gods gaande niet alleen over de ongelijkheid in dit, maar ook in 't Toek. leven; eene verkiezing en eene verwerping. Maar praedest. niet op zich maar in verband met raad en voorz., ook heel de wereld, de physisch, de ethische en de geestelijke

[8] wereld, (2 wereld der gelovigen, zaliger), Natuurorde, zedel. Orde, geestelijke orde: physis, ethos spiritus (pneumatische). Te samen één raad, één besluit, ééne godd. conceptie van 't al.

Voorts deze raad Gods niet eenzijdig op bevatte als stilliggend besluit in de eeuwigheid, en dan wereld als uitvoering, ontw. daarvan (deistisch, Hastie), maar als wilsdaad, tevens, als actief, kracht in werkend op alles sprinkvader v. alle gebeurt in nat. en gesch. Eeuwigheid in tijd, alomtegenw. In ruimte, God in schepsel. In Hem leven we en bewegt we ons. God draagt alles door 't woord zijner kracht. Alles bestaat saam in Hem. Rede - wil grondslag en wortsel v. alles (Hegel en Schopenh. vereenigd.)

En dan als raad: idee en wil van een wijs heilig rechtvaardij God, die zz. rechtvaardije zal, op wier wij vertrouwen kunnen.

[9] IV. Maar deze praedestinatie is dikwerf misverstaand, en moet goed opgevat. Men kan er licht een caricatuur van maken, en moet er voorzichtig met omgaan. Geen curieuze onderzoekingen (Dordsche Synode).^[14] Ter toelichting dus: a) de praedest. is niet besluit, dat als Damocles zwaard^[15] boven 't hoofd der menschen veels, en op gegeven oogenblik, willekeurig, neervalt plotseling. Maar 't is de raad en de wil van een God, die niet alleen transcendent, doch ook immanent is en alle dingen, alle gebeuren draagt en voortbrengt. b) de wijsheid en de tijd niet alleen een vóór en na, maar de eeuwigheid is in den tijd, klopt in polsslag van ieder oogenblik. c) in den raad Gods ligt alles precies zoo ineen^[16] geschackled, geordend, gesystematizeerd als in de werkelijkheid, dus ook 't verband van oorzaken, gevolgen, van geloof en zaligheid, van ongeloof, ellende. d) de redelijke, zedelijke natuur v. d. mensch, zijn zedelijk bewustzijn, rede, geweten, plicht besef, verantwoordelijkheid, berouw, bekeering, geloof enz. staan in den raad Gods in 't zelfde verband, als in werkelijkheid. | De raad Gods is grondslag, dragen, bron van die zedelijke en

[10] en zedelijk natuur van den mensch e) de wereld is in heel haar lengte en breedte een ontvouwing van de gedachten Gods, van eeuwige ideeën. Ook van de godd. idee van^[17] de zonde, die zelf om zoo te zeggen haar eigen wet heeft. Dat is de vloek den booze daad, dat ze altijd weer booze daden voortbrengen moet. Wie de zonde doet, is er wordt steeds meer haar slaaf. De begeerlijkheid ontvangen hebbende baart zonde en de zonde des dood. Er is in de zonde een process, leidende tot verharding (Farao), zelfs tot lastering van den H. Geest. f) Maar omdat we te doen hebben met een persoonlijk God, met een wijzen heiligen raad, daarom geen fatalisme en geen Toeval, geen wanhoop en geen willekeur.^[18] Maar vertrouwen, dat alles toch aan het einde goed zal zijn, zooals God het wil. g) 'T is ook niet panth. (Hastie 252) God niet auteur van de zonde (253) zonde geen entiteit; menschel. vrijheid wordt gehandhaafd, maar vrije wil geen lib. indifferentiae onderstelligheid, abs. neutr.; vrijheid sluit alleen dwang uit (257), in handelen naar eigen natuur.

[11] V. Daarom tenslotte is deze belijdenis bron van zekerheid en troost.

a) Wij menschen hebben vóór alles zekerheid v. noodzaak zekerheid aang. de wereld en ons zelven. We kunnen die niet krijgen uit ons zelven, zijn te onvast, niet door komt, wetenschap, goede werken, maar alleen door vast vertrouwen, geloof. We hebben ze in dezen tijd van twijfel, onvastheid, vereenigen stelsels, vooral noodig

b) Hoe krijgen we die? Modern uitgedenkt: doordat we vast overtuigd zijn, dat ons denken, kennen, gevoelen, willen handelen ligt in de lijn van de wereld ontwikkeling in tune is with the infinite^[19] (Trine),^[20] in harmonie met het al, eenswillend met God in zijn raad, voor eeuwigheid. Dus vastelijk gelooven, dat de wereld zin heeft, ondanks allen onzin, doel ondanks alle toeval, besteming ondanks al 't onredelijk, nu ook is dezer oorlog.

c) Bewijs daarvoor. Er zijn er vele, ook van wetensch. aard. Maar het relig. bewijs bij uitnemendheid is de persoon van X en zijn werk. Wat was zijn werk? De schikking van kon. Gods, tegenover rijk v. wereld en Satan. Welnu, dat is 't doel Gods met de wereld. Jezus was Gods eigen Zoon. Zijn woord 't woord Gods. Bij Hem ons aan

[12] sluitend, ons latende opnemen in zijn rijk, dat is, geloovende in zijn naam — dan zijn we zeker, dat we zijn denken handelen als God wil, in de lijn van Gods wereldbestuur.

d) dat geloof geeft zekerheid voor de wereld, en ook pers. voor ons zelven. Geen nood; en zijn zeker, dat niets ons scheiden zal van de liefde Gods in X; we zijn kinderen en erfgenamen (Rom. 8). Zoo God voor ons is, wie dan tegen!

e) en door kennen, zullen we kloeke daden doen.^[21] De belijdenis der praed. bevordest een zedelijk, actief leven. De gesch. bewijst dat. Ritschl terecht tegen Rome: we moeten eerst kinderen Gods zijn, dan gaan we werken als kinderen Gods. Niet om loon, maar uit dankbaarheid. Niet als knecht, maar als kind.

f) en dan troost in omstandigheden, Heid.cat. vr. 1; in leven en streven, voor tijd en eeuwigheid. Geen Luth. scheiding van vroomheid, leven, religie en wetenschap, Theol. en philos (cf. Ritschl) Hastie 11. Maar alles voort gaande onvouwing, ontplooing van Gods glorie in zijne schepselen, van lager tot hooger, door natuur, ethos, genade heen. Electie de kroon! Daarop loopt alles uit. Zonde ellende zelf middel tot dit doel. Zoo komt Gods ontfermis uit. Uit door tot God alles. God alles in allen.

English Translation of the Outline of the Speech

[1] Predestination Feb. 20, 1918
I. One of the most significant problems:
unity, diversity, spirit, matter, being, becoming, substance, fact and actuality, I, not-I.
unity: I, self-conscious, pers. synthetic function
diversity, not I, becoming, to change, in our spirit, body, world, striving for unity in diversity, system, organism, in thought, globus intellectualis [the intellectual globe]
Attempts to transport, on organ. on mechan.
Body or temple
Brahm., Vedarel. Buddhism, magic, karma, Elea. Xeno, Parm. Zeno, Spinoza substance
Heraclitus actuality, becoming Fichte, Hegel
Nietzsche.
Pluralism: atomistic, dynam., monadology,
energy, electrons
Theism: a) third above two, synthesis
b) I pers. unity, thinking

[2] II. Unity and diversity in the physical world: heaven and earth, above, below, east & west, masculine & feminine, right, left, light, dark, day and night, other remaining contradictions.
Psych: distinctions in offering, to power, to bring to life - lifeless. Then: unconscious-conscious, then self-conscious consciously, asleep dreaming, waking monad.
Ethical: good and evil. Ποθεν το κακον. Unde malum [Where does evil come from?].
Astounding problem
Buddh: Karma, Pyth., Plato: pre-existence fall. Origens id. Kant. Jul. Müller. Theosophy, karma, Pelag.
But: a) humanity as atomistic, aggregate
b) incomprehensible that all fell
c) hereditary, original sin, interconnectedness of the generations.
Theism: a) sin cannot be outside God’s counsel
b) God is above sin, can employ it.

[3] III. This is not all that bad, but several consequences follow. Not true, la farce est jouée [the farce is over]. Immortality is an articulus mixtus^[22] [mixed article], a demand according to the ethical world order; of meaning, purpose of the world, of God’s kingdom that becomes.
a) No one dares to say: it makes no difference what and how you live; what you are.
b) Seriousness of the conscience, of Kant’s rigorous categorical imperative. Ethos high above physis.
c) reward and punishment. All is judged — indifferent.
That life is not indifferent to the hereafter. Theosophy. Reincarnation. Karma.

Thus a variety of fate: object of predestination. Not outside Gods governance. What is last in execution is first in intention.

Predestination is not separate from God’s governance over everything providence
In predestination everything is connected, just as in reality.
God’s wise counsel, idea and action, comes to revelation in the world; everything leads to God’s glory.

[4] IV. Predestination is therefore also not in conflict with morality consciousness, factors, because
a. Predestination does not only decide everything beforehand, but is also working, guiding idea and force. Eternity above, also in time. Immanent.
b. Everything proceeds from God’s counsel in that order, connected, as in reality. Thus also sin, moral conscience,^[23] repentance, contrition, hardening, blasphemy
c. In sin also a law: the desire having received. Sheol of sin. That is a curse of evil act
V. Source of certainty, comfort.
a. Certainty in our soul, yet not resting on ourselves, but upon truth
b. Aligning our will [with God’s will], accordingly, our will lies in the extension of God’s will, of which all things lie
c. Historical proof: person and work of Christ, death and resurrection. Die and become
d. Comfort: everything will work out in the end
e. Courage, bravery
f. to the end post of time

English Translation of the Text of the Speech

Predestination Feb. 20th, 1918

[1] Unity is a foundational concept (Eisler)^[24] springing out of the self-consciousness concerning the self, which is itself one, it connects all things in unity (unity of function, striving for unity); the source of everything is the concept of unity. The I is itself unity, identity in the past and the present and the future. Not – I.

Thus, subjective unity: but then also objective unity, the unity of a thing (Scholasticism “everything that is, is, insofar as it is one”^[25]), and then again “the point of unity, of the body, uniformity, principles, substances, components intelligence”^[26] or “numerical unity” and “transcendent,”^[27] or metaphysical unity. And finally life and consciousness are: sleeping, dreaming, waking monadic unity of the world. What does it reside in? In God (Theism, Deism, Pantheism, Atheism).

According to Kant, the I is also the creator, the source of the objective unity in the world, through its synthetic function; the unity of the self-consciousness is the source of all unity in the knowledge; bringing coherence to the central elements.

[2] Unity does not exclude multiplicity, diversity. Multiplicity (Eisler) is a variety of onenesses (monads, individual, atoms); and we call this multiplicity on the ground of experience. How both unity and diversity (multiplicity, difference) may be united, there have been many attempts. From whence dissimilarity, diversity. Organism and mechanism are considered in opposition to each other; image of growth and construction, of body and temple (Paul).

(Monism)

Based on the idea of unity is the philosophy of Veda, according to which all is one and diversity is an appearance, maya [illusion]. Brahmanism was developed on the foundation of four Veda (=science) books, especially the Rig-Veda. [Brahmanism] is a pantheistic system: the world develops from Brahman, the one being, the foundation of all things; but the world’s distinct existence is an evil, wherein there is redemption through asceticism; world, soul must return to the one. It rests therefore on the eternal cycle of things, of the world, a closed and infinite succession of birth and rebirth, suffering and redemption, death and life, return unto the Absolute being, from the shelter of individual existence; separation of the soul from the material origin of the individual existence is in Buddhism

[3] karma, the ethical acts (but did it exist before the creatures? [Silbernagl, Der Buddhism, 31]^[28]), which now continually determines my destiny, until [karma] kills one’s will to live.

Thus, the Eleatics school: The being is one, diversity, movement is illusory. The entirety of the spiritual and visible world is phenomenal. Being is by nature unchangeable, pure being, without becoming. Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno. Becoming is [the] problem here. Thus, it is also in all Pantheistic systems; a transition cannot be found from being to becoming, unity to diversity, God to the world. Pantheism constructs itself from or through images, sound and wave, sun and rays. And then from emanation to the abundance of God’s being or development (Hegel): reason is nothing, becoming all things.

On the opposite side, one proceeds out of diversity, [out of continuous change, fluctuation], becoming. Heraclitus joined all being up in an eternal becoming, both nature and history. Not substantively but actually, as did J. G. Fichte, Hegel, Wundt, Nietzsche. Being is thus eternal activity, creative activity, eternally producing, power, will (Schopenhauer), impulse, passion.

[4] Pluralism proceeds from the diversity. Reality is a diversity of indivisibles, atoms, independent beings absolutely distinct from each other. Those beings can again now be understood as material or spiritual. Then one gets Atomism (matter) in the ancient times of Democritus. Atoms in empty space, separated, equal in quality, distinguished only in form, ἀπαθης [“without suffering”], unable to suffer, eternally in motion. Things are compounds of atoms, mechanical, aggregate. Chance (like in pantheism: fate εἱμαρμένη).

Spiritual oneness, henaden, monaden, monadology. Monaden were more psychological, initially conceived by Leibniz. Not one substance (Spinoza) but many: not matter, undivided (atomism), but incorporeal, inexhaustibly punctual, simple, psychological, indivisible in itself, metaphysical points, simple substances, unchanging, without windows, intrinsic and developing into consciousness, with a sort of conscience and will. And thus in more recent times by Lotze, I. H. Fichte, Ulrici, Busse, etc. And then in a material sense, the will understood as action (Wundt), energies (Ostwald), dynamics (Hartmann), the starting point of motion and purpose, force center (Leibmann), cf. electrons, ions (H. de Vries).

Not two, but three: Third higher synthesis, life confirmed. Christianity provides the solution in the wisdom and will of God: unity and diversity are in its thought, its system; if the world is presently a system of thought, its unity, diversity are given in her; called into being through Gods will, his holy, moral will.

[5] “While neither of them satisfies mediation sought between being and becoming, unity and diversity. Thus Buddhism with Karma, Pythagoras, Plato, with the diversity of the idea, centralized in the idea of the good, and with the pre-existence of like souls, are imprisoned in the body.” ^[29]

II. But unity and diversity in the expansive physical world does not shock us. In the psychological world, even more: there was a distinction in gifts and powers, intellect and mind, heart and willpower. Yet more shocking in the religious-ethical world: good and evil, justice and injustice, evil people and good people, etc. But from this diversity in the unity of the human race. Unde malum. Ποθεν το κακον? [Where does evil come from?] The answer is sought by Buddhism in Karma (see above). By Pythagoras and Plato in diversity of ideas centralized in the idea of the good and multitude of equal pre-existence, who fell and were punished in their bodies according to her evil (always through, after death: reincarnation). Through Plotinus and Gnostics in the connection of souls, light elements, with the material origin, which is the cause of the distinction. By Origen with his doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul. By Kant with intelligible freedom of action. By Julius Müller etc.

They all have this in common, that the ethical distinction

[6] they want to derive from an ethical act, from an act of the will. Cf. Pelagius,^[30] that sin is not derived from an act at the beginning of the world but from the fall of each man separately, making each man ethically into Adam. But then, a) the human race becomes thus dissolved into an aggregate of individuals, b) the ethical domain is thus totally separated from the physical and [the] psychological. Utterly isolated, c) it is incomprehensible, then that everyone has fallen without exception, d) it is blind to the reality of the ethical connection of humanity,^[31] for the heredity of also their own psychological and ethical attributes, e) it is in a conflict with every pious confession: we all have sinned, are like the others, and tremble with that one of grace, recognized through every honorable pious prayer.^[32] Not the Pharisee, but the tax collector.^[33]

Christianity here gives reconciliation and resolution, in the wisdom of God’s counsel. Such a terrible phenomenon such as sin, which enters into all things, etc., cannot be extracted from God’s counsel. Then the world would be beyond his control. Then randomness, chance everywhere, the end and purpose of the world uncertain. All people would be independent, autonomous, acting as they please. Atomism, pluralism, anarchy.

[7] III. Now this would have not been all so bad, if either with death everything is through, or all would be delivered after death. But that is not the case. La farce est jouée is untrue.^[34] Nobody is comfortable with that. Immortality stands fixed, it is an element of natural religion; humanity is destined for eternity. And concerning the second, one may dare to say: “in the end it doesn’t matter what you believe,” but no one says: “it does not matter how you live, or who and what you are!” That no one can say, who first deals with his conscience, with the moral law, with the categorical imperative,^[35] with the justice of the moral law, with the real distinction of good and evil, with the experience that there is good and evil, justice and injustice. This is recognized by Kant, and by moderns at the meeting of the modern theologians. We must accept that there will be in the life hereafter a difference in lot, in much greater diversity than the terms heaven and hell indicate, because there are endless degrees in heaven and hell, in reward and punishment. Diversity remains.

This being the case, there must be a predestination, a counsel of God that is not only about disparity in this life, but also in the future life; an election and a reprobation. But predestination not on its own, but in connection with the counsel and providence, also of the entire world, the physical, the ethical, and the spiritual

[8] world, (two worlds of believers, the living and the passed on), natural order, moral order, spiritual order: physis, ethos, spiritus (pneumatic). Together one counsel, one decision, one divine conception of it all.

Furthermore, this counsel of God is not to be one-sidedly understood as a static decision in eternity, with the world as its execution, its development (Deism, Hastie),^[36] but is an act of the will, at the same time, a dynamic force in operation on all, the fountainhead of everything that happens in nature and in history. Eternity in time, omnipresent in space, God in creation. In Him we live and move.^[37] God bears all things by the word of his power.^[38] All things exist together in him.^[39] Reason - Will are the foundation and roots of all things (Hegel and Schopenhauer combined).

And then as a counsel: idea and will of a wise, holy, and righteous God, who will justify himself, on whom we can rely.

[9] IV. But this predestination is often misunderstood and must be understood correctly. One can easily make a caricature of it, and it must be handled with care. No curious investigations (Synod of Dort). To explain, thus: a) predestination is not decreed, such as Damocles’ sword, above the heads of many men and at any given moment, arbitrarily, suddenly strikes down. But it is the counsel and will of a God, who is not only transcendent, but is also immanent in all things, and who supports and brings forth all that happens. b) Wisdom and time are not only before and after, but eternity is in time, it beats in the pulse of every moment. c) in the counsel of God everything is arranged precisely, jointed, orderly, systematized, as in reality, thus also from the relation of causes and effects, of faith and salvation, unbelief and misery. d) Morality, the moral nature of humanity, his moral consciousness, reason, conscience, sense of duty, responsibility, repentance, conversion, faith, etc. stand in the counsel of God in the same connection as in reality. The counsel of God is the foundation, support, source of morality, and

[10] of the moral nature of man. e) The world in her length and breadth is an unfolding of the thoughts of God, of eternal ideas. Also, of the divine idea of sin, which itself has its own law, so to speak. That is the curse of the evil act, that she must always bring forth evil acts again and again. Whoever commits the sin is increasingly becoming their own slave. Desire when it has conceived gives birth to sin, and sin brings forth death.^[40] There is within sin a process, leading to death (Pharaoh), even to blasphemy of the Holy Spirit. f) But because we are dealing with a personal God, with a wise, holy counsel, therefore not fatalism, and not coincidence, no despair, and nothing arbitrary. But trust, that everything will be good in the end, just as God wills it to be. g) It is also not pantheism (Hastie 1904, 252). God is not the author of sin (Hastie 1904, 253), sin is not an entity; human freedom is maintained, but free will not of the libertas indifferentiae^[41] hypothesis, absolute neutral; freedom excludes only coercion (Hastie 1904, 257), in acting according to your own nature.

[11] V. That is why finally, this confession is a source of certainty and comfort. a) We humans need certainty about the world and ourselves more than about anything else. We cannot get this out of our own selves, we are too unstable, it does not come through science, good works, but only through firm trust, faith. We particularly need it in these times of doubt, instability, unified systems. b) How do we get this? Expressed in modern terms: because we are firmly convinced that our thinking, knowing, feeling, and willing, and actions follow the trajectory of the development of the world, in tune with the infinite (Trine), in harmony with it all, being of one will with God in his counsel, for all eternity. Thus, we must firmly believe that despite all of the poppycock — the world makes sense, despite all chance —purpose, despite all the coincidence — destiny, despite all irrationality, even of this war

c) Proof of this. There are many proofs also of scientific nature. But in the end the ultimate religious proof is the person of Christ and his work. What was his work? The settlement of God’s kingdom, against the empire of this world and Satan. This, after all, is God’s purpose for the world. Jesus was Gods own Son. His word[was] the word of God. When we join him,

[12], by letting ourselves become part of his kingdom, that is believing in his name — then we are certain, that we are thinking, doing, as God wills in line with God’s governance of the world.

d) That faith provides certainty for the world, and also personally for ourselves. We need not be anxious about anything; and we are certain, that nothing will separate us from the love of God in Christ; we are children and heirs (Romans 8). If God is for us, who can be against us!

e) and through knowing this doctrine, we shall do bold deeds. The confession of predestination fosters a moral, active life. History testifies of this. Ritschl rightly states against Rome: We first must be children of God, then we will work as children of God. Not for wages, but out of gratitude. Not as slaves, but as children.

f) And then comfort in circumstances, Heidelberg Catechism, Question 1: “in life and death,” for time and eternity. Not a Lutheran separation of piety and life, religion and science, theology and philosophy (cf. Ritschl) (Hastie 1904, 10–11). But all ongoing, unfolding, developing of God’s glory in his creatures, from lower to higher, through nature, ethos, and grace. Election is the crown! This is the reason why all things happen the way they do. Sin and misery themselves are means to this end. Thus is God’s mercy manifested. From, through, and to God are all things. God is all in all.